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mridge@staffmail.ed.ac.uk Particularism takes an extremely ecumenical view of what considerations 
might count as reasons and thereby threatens to ‘flatten the moral land-
scape’ by making it seem that there is no deep difference between, for 
example, pain, and shoelace color. After all, particularists have claimed, 
either could provide a reason provided a suitable moral context. To avoid 
this result, some particularists draw a distinction between default and non-
default reasons. The present paper argues that all but the most deflation-
ary ways of drawing this distinction are either implausible or else insuf-
ficient to help the particularist avoid flattening the moral landscape. The 
difficulty can be avoided, however, if we reject particularism’s extremely 
ecumenical view of reasons. 
Keywords: default reason; defeasible generalizations; Jonathan Dancy; particu-
larism; primary reason; secondary reasonon of moral particularism holds that moral judgement 
pose the possibility of providing a ‘suitable supply of 
rticularists argue for their view primarily on the strength 
l ‘holism in the theory of reasons’. Holism in the theory 
 what is a reason in one context can be no reason at all,   * Many thanks to the participants of the conference on particularism hosted by the 
University of Kent in December 2004. Special thanks to Jonathan Dancy and Alan Thomas 
for helpful comments. Special thanks also to Christian Piller for some very helpful com-
ments about an earlier version of our discussion of enablers and defeaters. 
 Some of the material presented here draws heavily on Chapter 3 of our book Principled 
Ethics: Generalism as a Regulative Ideal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
 1. J. Dancy, Ethics Without Principles (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 7. 
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or a reason with the opposite valence, in another context. We have argued 
elsewhere that this argument is unsound or question-begging, but we shall 
not repeat the main lines of that argument here.2 Instead, we want to explore 
a concern which arises out of the radical sort of holism to which particu-
larists are committed. For the combination of holism and particularism, in 
turn, suggests that an enormous range of considerations can be reasons for 
action. Here it is worth pausing to remember some of the more memorable 
examples particularists have offered as considerations which can have moral 
significance in the right context. Here is Margaret Little: 
Depending on which case the comparison is made to, any feature may assume 
moral significance, from shoelace colour to the day of the week: after all, against 
a rich enough story, there are cases in which the change from Tuesday to Wed-
nesday makes all the difference.3
 Of course, there is a sense in which a hardy generalist can agree with Little’s 
comments. For example, a hedonistic act utilitarian can admit that shoelace 
colour or the day of the week can assume moral significance if the context is
right, since shoelace colour or day of the week can sometimes influence the 
consequences of various actions. Insofar as shoelace colour or day of the week 
can figure in the content of a promise, a Kantian can also admit that such fea-
tures can assume moral significance. In order to distinguish particularism
from these hardy generalist accounts of how such eccentric features can mat-
ter, Little presumably wants to insist that such seemingly eccentric features as 
shoelace colour can in some sense have direct moral significance if the context 
is right. In our view, the most plausible gloss on this idea is that such features 
can figure in the content of moral reasons for action. Jonathan Dancy goes so 
far as to insist that, ‘we can give no sense to the idea that we might now have 
finished the list of moral principles or of properties that can make a difference 
sometimes…there is no limit to the number of properties which can on occa-
sion be important’.4 Once again, it must be taken as read that Dancy does 
not intend this point in the anodyne sense in which a utilitarian or Kantian 
could accept it. Nor should it be surprising that particularists make such 
strong claims about what sorts of considerations can be moral reasons for 
action. For if the number of possible reasons were finite and manageable then 
the idea that we might codify the moral landscape would look much more 
plausible.
 One danger that has not been lost on particularists is that their extremely 
ecumenical view of moral reasons for action threatens to flatten the norma-
tive landscape in an implausible way. After all, even if we think that in the 
right context shoelace colour can provide a reason for action, there surely is  2.  See S. McKeever and M. Ridge, ‘What Does Holism Have to Do With Particu-
larism?’, Ratio (2005), pp. 93-103. 
 3. M. Little, ‘Moral Generalities Revisited’, in B. Hooker and M. Little, Moral Particu-
larism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 291. 
 4.  J. Dancy, Moral Reasons (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), p. 67.
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an important difference between considerations of shoelace colour and con-
siderations of pain, pleasure, promising and the like. Mark Lance and 
Margaret Little put the worry very clearly: 
In unqualified form, moral holism of the sort just outlined seems to imply that 
lying, killing and the infliction of pain have no more intimate connection to 
wrongness than do truth-telling, healing and the giving of pleasure. After all, each, 
in the right context, can have a positive, negative or neutral moral import. But 
the morally wise person, one might have thought, is someone who understands 
that there is a deep difference in moral status between infliction of pain and 
shoelace colour, even if both can, against the right narrative, be bad-making.5
 Particularists have tried to show how they can avoid any unfortunate flat-
tening of the normative landscape by drawing a distinction between default 
reasons and non-default reasons. Roughly, the idea is to privilege certain 
considerations as default reasons, where the status of such considerations as 
a reason with a given valence does not stand in need of explanation. By 
contrast, non-default reasons are sometimes reasons but their status as rea-
sons cannot be assumed and always stands in need of explanation. Drawing 
some such distinction does seem essential to making particularism plausible, 
and in this article we explore different ways of understanding the distinction
between default reasons and non-default reasons. The distinction can be given 
metaphysical, epistemological and pragmatic readings. Read metaphysically,
we argue that the distinction is untenable (section I). Read epistemologically, 
we argue that the distinction cannot do the work particularists need it to do 
(section II). Read pragmatically, we argue that the distinction is tenable and 
may be adequate for the particularist’s purposes though this is certainly not 
the reading of the distinction particularists themselves have favoured (sec-
tion III). Whether this reading is nonetheless sufficient for their purposes 
depends on whether we should think the normative landscape is necessarily 
not flattened or whether we should be confident only that our local norma-
tive landscape can reasonably be understood as not flattened. Our own view 
is that the best way to avoid the flattening of the normative landscape is to 
reject the particularist’s highly ecumenical conception of reasons for action 
and more generally of what kinds of features can assume direct moral sig-
nificance.
I. The Metaphysical Reading 
To convey an intuitive feel for the basic idea behind the distinction between 
default reasons and non-default reasons, we can do no better than to quote 
Dancy’s own admittedly metaphorical way of putting it. Some reasons, Dancy 
claims, ‘arrive switched on, though they may be switched off if the circum-
stances so conspire, while others arrive switched off but are switched on by  5.  M. Lance and M. Little, ‘Particularism and Anti-Theory’, in D. Copp (ed.), The
Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 20-21. 
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appropriate contexts’.6 Making the same distinction in the theory of value, 
Dancy remarks that, ‘some features come switched on already, as it were, 
though they can be switched off by other features; others do not come 
switched on, but they can be switched on by a suitable context’.7 A ‘default 
reason’, then, is a consideration whose reason-giving force has a default set-
ting. Pain, for example, might be in this sense a default reason. It ‘arrives’ as 
a reason against performing an action that would promote it, but (in the 
spirit of holism) can be switched off by context. Though intuitive, the lan-
guage of arriving and switching suggests that some considerations have the 
force of reasons independently of context. This suggestion is at odds with at 
least some particularists who emphasize that considerations can have reason-
giving force only in a surrounding context.8 Fortunately, the familiar parti-
cularist tools of defeaters and enablers can help unpack the metaphor. A 
default reason is a consideration whose status as a reason does not stand in 
need of explanation by some further feature of the situation—it does not 
require an enabler. Non-default reasons do stand in need of such explanation 
and require an enabler.9 One interesting corollary here seems to be that one 
and the same consideration could be a default reason with respect to one 
valence and a non-default reason with respect to the opposite valence. The
example of pain is a good illustration if we agree with those particularists who 
have argued that the fact that an action would cause pain is sometimes a rea-
son in its favour. When the fact that an action causes pain is a reason against 
the action it is plausibly a default reason, for the idea that pain counts against 
an action stands in no obvious need of explanation. By contrast, when an
action causing pain is a reason in favour of the action, its having this valence 
will require some enabler, e.g. that the pain is constitutive of athletic achieve-
ment.10
 Dancy understands the distinction between default and non-default reasons 
as a metaphysical one. The idea is not simply that some considerations usually 
do have a particular reason-giving force or that we should expect or presume
them to have a given status as reasons. Instead, the distinction concerns the 
considerations themselves. Pain is a reason against (when it is) just because 
of the nature of pain. To see things this way, then, is not just to know the  6. Dancy, Ethics Without Principles, p. 113. 
 7. J. Dancy, ‘Are There Organic Unities?’ Ethics 113 (2003), pp. 629-50 (638). 
 8. Little (‘Moral Generalities Revisited’) emphasizes this point and understands it as 
one of the central lessons of holism. To think that a consideration could have a reason-
giving force antecedent to its position in a surrounding context is, she claims, to subscribe to 
a dubious ‘ideal model’ of moral reasons. 
 9. G. Cullity, ‘Particularism and Presumptive Reasons’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society, Supp. edn (2002), pp. 169-90, marks the distinction in a similar way. What he calls 
‘presumptive reasons’ are ‘pro tanto reasons unless undermined’. Though Cullity does not 
explicitly define non-presumptive reasons, one might think that they are considerations that 
must first be ‘enabled’.
 10. The example is from Lance and Little, ‘Particularism and Anti-Theory’. 
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contingent fact that the fact that an action would cause pain is a reason 
against the action, but rather to know something about pain. By contrast, 
when the fact that an action would cause pain is a reason in favour of the 
action there must be an enabler which explains why this is so. This way of 
drawing the distinction is extremely natural for a particularist, as it builds 
heavily on the machinery of enablers and defeaters emphasized in their 
discussions of holism. Moreover, this approach seems to avoid flattening the 
normative landscape in a fairly robust way, as the distinction between default
reasons and non-default reasons on this interpretation is meant to be meta-
physically deep and not contingent on local circumstances. 
 However, the metaphysical reading of the distinction between default 
reasons and non-default reasons is untenable. For on any plausible version of 
holism all reasons require enablers, in which case all reasons are non-default 
reasons in this sense, in which case the normative landscape remains flat-
tened. Why do we say all reasons require enablers? Here we invoke the 
plausible idea that the presence of certain considerations are always neces-
sary for any consideration to count as a reason but which are not themselves 
part of the reasons which they make possible. The best example of this is the 
fact that no fact can be a reason for an agent to perform an action if the 
agent cannot perform the action. Nonetheless, as particularists have plausibly
insisted, the fact that an agent could do something is not part of the reason 
to do it. The reason to meet me for lunch is that you promised, not that you 
promised and can. If the fact that an agent could perform an action is not a 
reason or a part of a reason, though, then what is it? The tempting answer is 
to say it is an enabler for all possible reasons, and indeed we think that this 
answer is correct. So all reasons need at least one enabler, in which case 
there can be no default reasons in Dancy’s canonical sense and the distinc-
tion lacks interest.  
 The preceding objection demonstrates the untenability of Dancy’s canoni-
cal formulation of the distinction between default reasons and non-default 
reasons. However, a very close cousin of Dancy’s formulation can survive 
this first objection. For we can and should distinguish what might be called 
global enablers from local enablers and redraw the metaphysical version of the 
distinction between default reasons and non-default reasons in terms of local 
enablers rather than global enablers.11 A global enabler is a consideration 
which must obtain before there can be any reason for an agent to perform an 
action. That the agent can perform the action is a clear example of a global 
enabler. More controversially, perhaps there can be a reason for someone to 
do something only if the agent can refrain from doing it as well. The idea 
would be that reasons function to guide our actions but guidance is possible 
only when an agent has some choice between alternatives. If an agent cannot 
help but perform an action then talk of guidance and reasons is simply out of  11. Dancy prefers the terminology of ‘generic’ and ‘specific’. 
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place.12 Though just which considerations are global enablers will be a contro-
versial question (and one we will not try to settle), the idea of a global enabler
is tied to the general idea of a reason for action. By contrast, some enablers 
(most of the ones particularists discuss) are local, having to do with specific 
kinds of reasons rather than with the very idea of a reason for acting as such. 
For example, suppose that while the fact that an action will involve pain nor-
mally is a reason against it, if the pain is constitutive of athletic accomplish-
ment then that very same consideration can be a reason in favour of the 
action.13 In that case, the fact that a given pain would be constitutive of 
athletic accomplishment can function as a local enabler. 
 This distinction between global and local enablers shows the way to a more 
subtle distinction between default reasons and non-default reasons which is 
very much in the spirit of Dancy’s canonical version of the distinction but 
which avoids the objection from global enablers. We might give the idea of a
default reason the following intuitive gloss: a default reason just is a fact which 
does not depend for its status as a reason on any further facts beyond those 
required by the very concept of a reason for acting. The existence of ‘global 
enablers’ then poses no threat to the proffered distinction. For a default reason 
is on this account not a fact which stands in need of no enablers whatsoever 
to function as a reason, but rather is a fact which requires no local enablers 
to function as a reason. 
 However, even on this more refined understanding, the metaphysical read-
ing of the distinction between default reasons and non-default reasons ulti-
mately collapses. The tenability of the distinction depends on the tenability 
of the distinction between the presence of an enabler and the absence of a 
defeater but this distinction itself is untenable. Suppose that we agree that 
the fact that an action will promote pleasure is sometimes a reason but also 
maintain that its status as a reason depends (in part) on whether the pleasure 
would be sadistic. We can then describe our view in one of two ways. On the 
one hand, we could maintain that the fact that the pleasure promoted would 
be sadistic (when this is a fact) is a defeater, preventing the fact that the 
action would promote pleasure from functioning as a reason. Alternatively, 
we could maintain that the fact that the action is sadistic merely serves to 
indicate the absence of an enabling condition, understanding the fact that the
pleasure promoted is non-sadistic as an enabler which must be present for 
the fact that an action would promote pleasure to function as a reason. If we 
characterize the presence of sadism as defeater then we are still free to char-
acterize the fact that an action would promote pleasure as a default reason 
which needs no enablers. If instead we characterize the presence of sadism as
the absence of an enabler then we no longer can say that fact about pleasure is  12. Kant makes a similar point in the Groundwork when he claims that imperatives apply 
only to ‘imperfect wills’, wills capable of being determined by rational norms, but also sub-
ject to competing motivations (K 413-414). 
 13. The example is borrowed from Lance and Little, ‘Particularism and Anti-Theory’. 
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a default reason in the intended sense. This naturally leads to a series of ques-
tions. How do we determine which of these descriptions (needs an enabler vs. 
needs the absence of a defeater) is correct? This epistemological question is 
difficult enough, but even more difficult questions concern the logical inde-
pendence of the notion of an enabler and the notion of a defeater. Is there 
any reason in our example to think that both descriptions of our view (the 
one couched in terms of non-sadism as an enabler and the one couched in 
terms of sadism as a defeater) could not both be correct? Indeed, is there any 
reason to suppose that claims about enablers and claims about defeaters are 
not really just notational variants on one another? 
 In our view, the answer to this last question is ‘no’ and this spells the end 
for the metaphysical reading. If a consideration needs an enabler in order to 
function as a reason then trivially that consideration can be defeated; the 
absence of the enabler is a defeater. Similarly, if a consideration’s status as a 
reason can be defeated then the consideration needs an enabler; the conjun-
tion of the negation of all of its possible defeaters is an enabler. Lest this seem 
too swift, note that enablers and defeaters are typically defined in coun-
terfactual terms. Here is Dancy: 
…in the absence of (2), (1) would not have favoured the action. In this sense, 
the presence of (2) enables (1) to favour (5).14
Certainly if we understand enablers and defeaters in counterfactual terms then
the fact that a consideration needs an enabler entails that it can be defeated 
and vice versa. Moreover, Dancy himself goes on explicitly to endorse this nec-
essary connection: 
…trivially, the absence of an enabler will disable what would otherwise be a 
reason.15
Though Dancy here endorses only the inference from ‘needs an enabler’ to 
‘can be defeated’ there is no textual or rational reason (given his counter-
factual definition) to suppose that he would deny the inference in the other 
direction.
 Perhaps a purely counterfactual conception of defeaters and enablers is 
too crude. We might instead hold that for a consideration E to be an enabler 
of a fact F as a reason to x in circumstances C is for E to be a possible feature 
of C such that E’s presence would explain why F is a reason to x. This refine-
ment of the conception of enablers and defeaters does not help, though. For 
being an enabler means that E is a member of a set of possible features of C 
(E might or might not be the only member of the set) such that the absence 
of all of the features in that set would defeat F’s status as a reason to x in C.
Moreover, the absence of all of a candidate reason’s enablers also would explain
why the candidate is not really a reason. Someone puzzled about why a given 14. Dancy, Ethics Without Principles, p. 39. 
 15. Dancy, Ethics Without Principles, p. 41. 
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consideration was not a reason in a given case could find it illuminating that 
none of the various further facts which would explain its functioning as a 
reason is present. Of course, these further facts may be too numerous to list, 
but we could still perhaps give our interlocutor an idea of the kinds of 
considerations which would have to be present for the fact to function as a 
reason by listing representative examples and then explaining that no such 
feature is present. On this way of thinking, to say something is an enabler in 
a given context entails that it is a member of a set of possible features, such 
that the absence of all of the features in that set is a defeater. So once again 
the fact that a consideration needs an enabler entails that it can be defeated. 
Similarly, to say a consideration D is a defeater of a fact F as a reason to 
perform a given action is to say that its presence can explain why the feature 
is not a reason. This seems to entail that D is a member of a set of possible 
features such that the absence of all of those features enables F to be a reason 
to perform the action. For if a consideration is a reason in favour of a given 
sort of action unless defeated then the absence of all defeaters will explain 
why that consideration functions as reason. So the fact that a consideration 
stands in need of an enabler entails that it can be defeated and vice versa.
 The preceding line of argument is fairly abstract, but the basic point is
actually quite simple. An example should help get the idea across. Suppose for 
the sake of argument that the status of the consideration ‘it would cause pain’ 
as a reason has exactly two defeaters: (a) the pain is constitutive of some
excellence and (b) the pain is constitutive of a deserved punishment. The fact 
that considerations of pain have these defeaters also entails that such consid-
erations stand in need of an enabler. The enabler is the conjunctive fact the 
pain is not constitutive of excellence and is not deserved. For the fact that a 
given pain is neither constitutive of an excellence nor deserved can explain 
why the fact that an action causes that pain should function as a reason not 
to perform the action. Someone who was perplexed at the idea that such a 
fact might function as a reason could gain understanding if told that the pain 
is neither constitutive of excellence nor deserved, since the person might 
have implicitly been assuming one of those conditions was not satisfied. 
Although a full theory of explanation goes well beyond the present scope, we 
take it that on any plausible account to figure in an explanation is to track
dependence relations in ways that can remove puzzlement about that which is 
explained thereby answering ‘why?’ questions about that which is explained.
On the toy theory under consideration, the fact that the pain is neither con-
stitutive of excellence nor deserved does track a dependence relation and 
citing those facts can thereby remove puzzlement and answer the relevant 
‘why?’ questions. This does not mean that the fact that the pain is not consti-
tutive of an excellence nor deserved fully explains why the fact that an action 
promotes pain functions as a reason when it does; they may provide only a 
partial explanation or be at best part of an explanation (these may not be the 
same). Since the presence of the pain in question is neither constitutive of 
excellence nor deserved can at least partially explain why the fact that an 
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action would produce such pain is a reason not to perform the action, it 
follows that the fact that the pain is neither constitutive of excellence nor 
deserved is an enabler. Of course, a particularist may insist that there will be 
far more possible defeaters for a candidate reason than two, and our example 
is in this sense just a toy example; the example was given only to illustrate the 
basic point in a simplified context. The fact (if it is a fact) that any plausible 
example will involve far more possible defeaters does not gainsay our basic 
point. That would instead just mean that the enabler in question will be the 
fact corresponding to a much longer list of possible defeaters. 
 So far we have used our example to show how the fact that a considera-
tion’s status as a reason can be defeated entails that the consideration needs 
an enabler in order to function as a reason. The example also illustrates how 
the fact that a consideration needs an enabler entails that it can be defeated. 
In our example the fact corresponding to the negation of (a)—that the pain 
is constitutive of an excellence—can explain why the fact that the action pro-
duces pain is not a reason not to perform the action. Since a defeater just is a 
fact that can explain why a fact that would otherwise be a reason with a given 
valence does not function as such a reason, this means that the fact corre-
sponding to the negation of (a) is a defeater. The same point applies, mutatis
mutandis, to the fact corresponding to the negation of (b). So the claim that a 
given fact functions as an enabler in the case at hand will entail that certain 
other facts would function as defeaters in the case at hand. The defeater(s) 
corresponding to the enabler present in a given case will be the facts corre-
sponding to the negation of each of the conjuncts of the conjunction corre-
sponding to the conjunctive enabler. In the limiting case in which the enabler
is not best understood as corresponding to a conjunction we should say that 
the fact corresponding to the negation of the enabler is a defeater. The main 
point here is that when a fact’s functioning as a reason with a given valence 
depends on the presence of certain facts, the absence of any one of those 
facts functions as a defeater and the fact corresponding to the conjunction of 
those facts functions as an enabler. 
 So any reason which can be defeated also trivially needs an enabler and 
vice versa. In that case, though, the distinction between default reasons and 
other reasons collapses into the distinction between invariable reasons and
context-sensitive reasons. For the idea was supposed to be that default reasons 
are considerations whose status as reasons does not stand in need of explana-
tion in the sense that they need no enablers. Given the preceding line of argument,
the only reasons which truly need no (local) enablers whatsoever will be rea-
sons which cannot be defeated, and those just are the invariable reasons. In 
that case, the distinction between default reasons and non-default reasons 
collapses into the distinction between variable reasons and invariable reasons. 
So we do not need a further distinction here; we have already marked the 
distinction between variable and invariable reasons more clearly in terms of 
variability. More to the point, the collapse of the distinction means that the 
idea of default reasons (so understood) will not do the kind of work that 
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particularists needed that distinction to do. For the distinction was supposed 
to mark an important divide within the category of context-sensitive reasons, 
and not to distinguish the variable from the invariable ones. Hence, drawn in 
this way the distinction cannot forestall the worry that particularism implau-
sibly flattens the normative landscape. However, the distinction between 
default reasons and non-default reasons can be drawn in other ways. 
II. The Epistemic Reading 
If Dancy’s metaphysical gloss on the distinction between default reasons and 
non-default reasons is untenable then it is tempting to try to draw the dis-
tinction in epistemological terms. Mark Lance and Margaret Little have 
developed just such a version of the distinction.16 Lance and Little endorse 
the particularist theses that all reasons depend for their status as reasons on 
context and that virtually any consideration could have moral import pro-
vided a suitable context. However, they also hold that only some considera-
tions paradigmatically have a particular moral force. Even considerations, 
which are paradigmatically reasons, however, are still only defeasibly reasons; 
there are circumstances in which such considerations are no reason at all or a 
reason with an opposite valence. To focus on one of their familiar examples, 
perhaps the fact that an action would cause pain is paradigmatically a reason 
against the action. Though pain can sometimes be a reason in favour (say, in 
cases of athletic challenge or justified punishment) of an action it is never in 
Lance and Little’s sense ‘defeasibly’ a reason in favour of an action. Lance 
and Little typically refer to such reasons as ‘defeasible reasons’ to emphasize 
their defeasibility. However, what is distinctive about these considerations is 
precisely not their defeasibility, for so-called non-defeasible moral reasons 
(like shoelace colour, for example) are only defeasibly reasons too—if any-
thing, their status as reasons is ‘more defeasible’. So ‘paradigmatic reasons’ 
seems to capture the idea they are after better than ‘defeasible reasons’, and 
we shall here use ‘paradigmatic reasons’ to refer to the sorts of reasons they 
have in mind. Little herself at one point uses the ‘paradigm’ terminology to 
characterize the idea, suggesting that deviant cases can be understood only 
‘by reference to a paradigm that carries the privileged valence’.17
 How exactly should we understand what it is for a consideration to be a 
paradigmatic reason? To say that a given consideration, such as pain, paradig-
matically has a certain normative force is to say that it has such a force in 
certain ‘privileged conditions’, and they suggest that privileged conditions 
come in different varieties.18 Sometimes the privileged conditions are those  16. See Lance and Little, ‘Particularism and Anti-Theory’, op. cit., and ‘Defeasibility and 
the Normative Grasp of Context’, Erkenntnis 61 (2004), pp. 435-55. 
 17.  M. Little, ‘On Knowing the “Why”: Particularism and Moral Theory’, Hastings 
Center Report (2001), pp. 32-40 (38).
 18. Lance and Little claim that the cases which follow are species of a single genus. It is 
not clear to us that this is the case. 
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in which things are morally aright. Thus killing has a negative moral valence 
unless things are morally amiss. Alternatively, Lance and Little suggest that 
being a paradigmatic reason can be matter of ‘explanatory asymmetry’ where 
explanation is understood as an epistemic idea. As Lance and Little put it, 
‘We can understand a situation in which lying is wrong-making without 
resort to any context in which it has the opposite valence; but to understand 
the moral status of lying in Diplomacy, one must understand the players as 
having agreed to play a game with these rules in a context in which lying has 
its typical valence’.19 On this view, then, even when lying has an abnormal 
valence, we can only understand this by reference to the normal or paradig-
matic case. Put another way, when lying is not a reason against, this must be 
seen as an exception to a general (but defeasible) norm against lying.20 In at 
least one context, Little suggests that this epistemological asymmetry is itself 
explained by a conceptual asymmetry. As she puts it, ‘…mastery of moral 
concepts is mastery of defeasible generalizations…one cannot be said to 
understand moral concepts without appreciating the privileging moves that 
lie at their heart’.21 So whereas one presumably can be competent with moral 
concepts without appreciating how shoelace colour can be morally relevant, 
one cannot on this account be competent with moral concepts without under-
standing that considerations of pain, deception and other familiar moral 
categories are paradigmatic moral reasons. This conceptual thesis would 
indeed explain the epistemological asymmetries Lance and Little discuss. 
However, the epistemological asymmetries presumably could be explained in 
other ways, so that the interest of what we are here characterizing as the 
‘epistemological reading’ does not depend on the conceptual gloss Little at 
one point gives it. Here we explore the epistemological conception of default 
reasons insofar as it can be divorced from this conceptual gloss. 
 Lance and Little have tapped into some extremely interesting and hereto-
fore neglected territory. In particular, the idea that some considerations are 
such that we can understand how they can function as a reason with one 
valence only if we understand how they can function as a reason with the 
opposite valence is a fascinating one which deserves further investigation. 
For example, suppose for the sake of argument that a retributive conception 
of punishment is correct. We do not here mean to endorse retributivism; the 
point is purely illustrative. We might then think that the fact that an action 
would cause pain can, in some contexts, be a reason in favour of the action,  19. Lance and Little, ‘Particularism and Anti-Theory’, p. 30. 
 20. It is unclear to us whether Lance and Little would claim that every consideration 
that can be a reason has some practical import defeasibly (even if it defeasibly has the 
import of being no reason at all either way). Lance and Little claim at once that, ‘For some-
thing to count as a reason for some given moral status, then whatever its moral import in 
this case pro or con, we are also attributing to it a defeasible moral import’ (‘Particularism 
and Anti-Theory’, p. 29). Elsewhere, though, they claim that, ‘For while shoelace colour can 
have various moral imports in various contexts, it has none of them defeasibly’ (p. 30). 
 21. Little, ‘On Knowing the “Why”’, p. 39. 
66 JOURNAL OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 4.1 (2007) 
as when its causing pain of the right sort is part of how the action provides a 
legitimately imposed punishment for a crime committed. Plausibly we can 
understand how pain can function as a retributive reason in favour of punish-
ment only if we understand how pain more paradigmatically functions as a 
reason against actions. For presumably part of the retributive idea is that it is 
precisely because pain is paradigmatically ‘to be avoided’ that it is appropriate 
to impose on someone for certain kinds of crimes. By contrast, one does not
need to understand how pain can function as a retributive reason in favour 
of punishment in certain contexts in order to understand how pain can 
function as a reason against actions more generally. Indeed, many people 
who explicitly reject retributivism seem to understand perfectly well how 
pain functions as a reason against actions more generally. This is a very 
interesting sort of asymmetry, and it is certainly one which is not true of 
considerations which can function as reasons in general. So assuming that 
holism about reasons is true, we can usefully sort candidate reason-giving con-
siderations into two classes—(a) those which are rightly associated with the 
sort of epistemic asymmetry illustrated by the case of pain/retribution and 
(b) those which are not. Call those considerations which fall into class (a) 
asymmetric reasons; call candidate reason-giving considerations which fall 
into class (b) symmetric reasons. 
 Our agenda here is not to cast doubt on the general importance of this 
way of distinguishing reasons, but rather to argue that it cannot perform one 
of the main jobs for which particularists like Lance and Little invoke it—to 
avoid the ‘flattening of the normative landscape’. Recall that Lance and Little 
are rightly keen to avoid the conclusion that particularists are committed to 
treating eccentric considerations like ones of shoelace colour as on a par with 
considerations of pain and promise-keeping. To equate shoelace colour (for 
example) with pain is to flatten the normative landscape in a way that is 
extremely implausible. Intuitively, if we accept the particularist/holist idea 
that just about any consideration can be a moral reason in the right context 
we need to draw a distinction between core and periphery such that pain, 
promise-keeping and pleasure end up in the core while shoelace colour ends 
up in the periphery. Our main point is that there is no reason whatsoever to 
think that this important core/periphery distinction will map neatly onto the 
independently interesting distinction between asymmetric reasons and sym-
metric reasons. 
 Before we explain why we think the core/periphery distinction will not map 
neatly onto the asymmetric/symmetric distinction, we should explain one 
important respect in which we disagree with Lance and Little about what we 
are calling asymmetric reasons. Some of Lance and Little’s examples suggest
that on their view the relevant sort of asymmetry can emerge in cases in which
a consideration is sometimes a reason with one valence and sometimes no rea-
son at all. Whereas we maintain that the relevant sort of asymmetry emerges 
only in cases in which a consideration is sometimes a reason with one valence 
and sometimes a reason against. So on our reading, only considerations which 
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can ‘go both ways’ can fall into the category of asymmetric reasons but on 
the Lance/Little account (it seems) a consideration can fall into the category 
of asymmetric reasons even if it can only be a reason with one valence or no 
reason at all. This emerges most clearly in the example of playing Diplomacy, 
where lying is no longer a reason against an action. Actually, some particu-
larists seem to suggest that in games like Diplomacy the fact that an action 
would be a lie actually becomes a reason in favour of the action but in our 
view this is an extremely implausible gloss on these cases.22 The reason to 
make a certain move in Diplomacy is that it will increase the odds that you 
will win or some such, and not that the move is an instance of lying. Poker is 
a perhaps more familiar example where it should be entirely clear that the 
reason to bluff is not that it is an instance of deception but rather that it will 
increase your expected winnings. To their credit, Lance and Little do not fall 
into this trap, but instead hold that when playing Diplomacy the fact that an 
action would be a lie is no longer a reason against it. However, this is why 
their gloss on the case as an instance of what we are calling asymmetric rea-
sons is problematic. For the suggestion is that we can understand the excep-
tional cases (Diplomacy, poker, etc.) only insofar as we understand how lying
functions as a reason against an action in the context in which the players 
agreed to play this sort of deception-tolerating game. This is fine as far as it 
goes, but the idea here seems to generalize too easily. For it will be true of any
consideration whose status as a reason can sometimes be defeated that we 
can adequately understand why it is not a reason here only if we understand 
how it can be a reason elsewhere. For to understand why something is not F 
here we must in general have some idea of how it can be F elsewhere if it can. 
If this is enough for a consideration to qualify as an instance of asymmetric 
reasons then any consideration whose status as a reason can ever be defeated 
will qualify as an instance of asymmetric reasons, and that makes the distinc-
tion far less interesting than it first appeared. Moreover, it certainly would 
render the distinction incapable of helping the particularist avoid the ‘flat-
tening of the normative landscape’. 
 Incidentally, we think that the preceding point is the kernel of truth in 
Dancy’s remark that, ‘one only needs to know the rule in order to under-
stand the exceptionality of the case where cruelty is a reason against—but to 
say this is to say too little to be interesting’.23 Dancy develops this point as
one horn of a dilemma, which is supposed to undermine the general interest of  22. Dancy takes this line about a game called Contraband, on the grounds that, ‘if one 
doesn’t do plenty of lying, it spoils the game’ (Dancy, Moral Reasons, p. 61). Presumably, 
though, some lies increase one’s chances of winning the game while other lies do not. The 
fact that one must do plenty of lying to avoid spoiling the game suggests that one should lie 
whenever it would increase one’s chances of winning (or at least not decrease one’s chances). 
The reason to tell an individual lie, though, is that it will increase one’s chances of winning 
or that it will make the game more fun; in our view the fact that you would be lying is never 
the reason in favour of a move in the game. 
 23. Dancy, Ethics Without Principles, p. 115. 
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the distinction between asymmetric and symmetric reasons. The other horn of
Dancy’s dilemma insists that, ‘It isn’t strictly true that in order to under-
stand the case where cruelty is not a reason against, one needs to know the 
rule. If we demand that, we demand too much’.24 In our view, this dilemma 
is too quick. For Lance and Little can navigate between the two horns of 
Dancy’s dilemma by insisting that what we must understand is not the 
exceptionality of a consideration’s not being a reason at all; that is trivial. 
Rather, what is interesting is the idea that we must understand how a con-
sideration can have one valence to understand how it could have the oppo-
site valence but not vice versa, and this does not seem trivial. Nor does this 
seem to impale the account on the other horn of Dancy’s dilemma. For we 
take it that the example of pain functioning as a retributive reason which can 
be understood only by reference to how pain normally functions as a reason 
with the opposite valence suggests that this is not always to ‘demand too 
much’. So long as we allow that pain can sometimes function as a retributive 
reason, the demand seems to us to be entirely reasonable. Even if we reject 
the possibility of retributive reasons, the example serves to illustrate that the 
basic idea is intelligible and interesting; we might only need more imagina-
tion to come up with a better example. This does, however, mean that we 
must depart from what seems to be the Lance/Little conception of asym-
metric reasons. On our proposed reading, only what we might call ‘bivalent’ 
considerations—considerations which can both function as reasons for and 
against—can fall into the category of asymmetric reasons. Considerations 
which are univalent but context-sensitive—that is, can sometimes be reasons 
with one valence and sometimes no reason at all but never a reason with the 
opposite valence—cannot fall into the category of asymmetric reasons on 
pain of trivializing the distinction. 
 We are now in a position to see why the distinction between asymmetric 
reasons and symmetric reasons does not map neatly onto the core/periphery 
distinction and therefore does not help the particularist avoid the flattening 
of the normative landscape. The Lance/Little idea seems to be that what we 
have called core reasons (pain, pleasure, promising and the like) will line up 
with what we have called asymmetric reasons while periphery reasons (shoe-
lace colour, and the like) will line up with symmetric reasons. In our view, 
neither of these alignments holds. First, there can be core reasons which are 
not asymmetric reasons. Indeed, any consideration which can never flip 
valences even though it can sometimes be no reason at all will not be an 
asymmetric reason, and it would be rather surprising if no core reasons were 
not in this sense univalent albeit context-sensitive. Perhaps the fact that an 
action would be deceptive is a good example, as it seems to us to sometimes
be a reason against (the normal case) and sometimes is no reason at all (poker, 
Diplomacy, etc.) but is never a reason in favour of an action. Moreover, even
 24. Dancy, Ethics Without Principles, p. 115. 
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some core reasons which plausibly can flip valences do not look like instances 
of asymmetric reasons. For example, suppose we agree with the standard 
particularist idea that sadism can turn considerations of pleasure into a rea-
son against an action. We take it that pleasure is plausibly a core reason in 
favour of an action. However, we do not think that someone must under-
stand how pleasure can provide a reason in favour in order to understand 
how sadistic pleasure can provide a reason against. To understand the former 
one might need only to understand ‘what pleasure is like’ in some suitable 
sense, while to understand the latter one needs only to understand that to 
take pleasure in something is a kind of endorsement and that pain ought not 
be endorsed in any way. Someone with a puritanical bent might not even 
believe that pleasure can ever provide a reason in favour of an action but still 
understand perfectly well how in the context of sadism pleasure can provide 
a reason against. So core and asymmetric reasons can come apart in at least 
two ways. First, there can be core reasons which are not even bivalent and 
hence not candidates for being asymmetric reasons. Second, there can be 
core reasons which are bivalent but which nonetheless are not asymmetric 
reasons as, in the case of sadism, as understood by particularists. So core rea-
sons and asymmetric reasons can come apart and are not the same. 
 Furthermore, there is no obvious reason to suppose that there could not be
instances of asymmetric reasons which are not core reasons. We are hampered
in arguing here in that we do not think that so-called periphery reasons like
shoelace colour really can ever be reasons. Moreover, we find it rather hard 
to ‘get inside the particularist’s head’ on this point and see what follows from 
a charitable gloss of their view on these matters. For although particularists 
often seem to suggest that considerations like shoelace colour can sometimes 
be reasons for action, they rather frustratingly never provide examples to 
illustrate this suggestion. We suspect that this is because any proffered 
example will be highly contestable—shoelace colour might influence the con-
sequences of an action but then the generalist can plausibly respond that it is 
the consequences that really provide the reason for action and not the shoe-
lace colour. The particularist must mean more than this, as we have seen that 
even a hedonisitc act utilitarian or dyed-in-the-wool Kantian can allow that 
shoelace colour might sometimes matter morally in various indirect ways (by 
figuring in a promise or influencing the consequences, for example). The more
radical suggestion here seems to be that shoelace colour itself can provide a 
reason, but no credible example has been given to illustrate this rather odd 
idea. Perhaps there has been a bit too much loose talk about shoelace colour. 
However, we see no reason ex ante to assume that if (contrary to fact) shoe-
lace colour really could sometimes provide a reason that it might not also be 
an asymmetric reason. From our perhaps naïvely generalist perspective, once 
we assume that shoelace colour can sometimes be a reason we see no a priori 
grounds for supposing that one could only understand how it can function as 
a reason with one valence if one understands how it functions with the oppo-
site valence but not vice versa. The challenge for the particularist who wants 
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to employ this distinction is to provide some reason for thinking that eccentric 
non-core reasons like shoelace colour could never be asymmetric.  
 The distinction between asymmetric reasons and symmetric reasons is 
only one member of a family of distinctions drawn by Lance and Little. We 
have devoted so much attention to this distinction only because it seemed to 
us to provide a more prima facie promising way of avoiding the flattening of 
the normative landscape than the other distinctions they draw. Moreover, we 
have related worries about their other distinctions. For example, we see no 
reason to suppose that the core/periphery distinction will map neatly onto 
the distinction between considerations which function as a reason with a 
given valence only when things are morally aright and those of which this is 
not true. We should, however, return to the questions raised by the more 
general characterization of their distinction in terms of privileging conditions 
instead of going through the various and sundry species of that genus. 
 The framework for the distinctions drawn by Lance and Little is cast in 
terms of asymmetry in privileged conditions. An obvious alternative would 
be to explicate the relevant asymmetry in terms of our local conditions. In 
our world, instances of pain might have a high probability of being such that 
there is reason not to promote them. By contrast, shoelace colour has at best 
a very low probability of being a reason of any valence. Most often, it is no 
reason at all. Whatever the merits of this idea it is emphatically not what 
Lance and Little have in mind. To be paradigmatically a reason is not merely 
to usually be a reason.25 In characterizing pain as paradigmatically providing 
a reason against performing an action that promotes it, Lance and Little insist 
we must mean more than that pain is likely to be a reason against in our local 
conditions. Once we put the conceptual gloss on their distinction to one side, 
what more could we mean? 
 To say that pain is paradigmatically a reason against, Lance and Little 
would argue, is at least in part to claim propriety for a certain inference—the 
inference from  
(P) X is and instance of pain. 
To:
(RAg) There is reason not to promote X. 
 The issue is what kind of propriety the inference has. It is not local statis-
tical reliability, for two reasons. Even in a world in which most instances of 
pain were not reasons against, pain would be defeasibly a reason against. 
Imagine, for example, a variation on an example of H.L.A. Hart.26 A world is 
populated by rational creatures whose crab-like bodies feature tough exo-
skeletons. It is very difficult to inflict pain on such a creature from the outside,  25. See Lance and Little, ‘Particularism and Anti-Theory’, pp. 27-28. For an example, 
they suggest that fish eggs normally turn into fish, even if the vast majority of fish eggs 
never do so. 
 26. The original example is from H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1961), p. 194. 
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and so there are very few instances of such pain. Nevertheless such creatures 
are prone to pain when they exert themselves in athletic competition, and 
most pain is like this. In such a world, the inference from (P) to (R) is unreli-
able, but even in such a world we might say the pain has the same ‘default’ 
status that it has in our world. Second, even if a given inference is reliable in 
local conditions, this does not establish the kind of norm Lance and Little 
have in mind. In our world of crab-like creatures, the inference from 
(P) X is an instance of pain. 
To:
(RFor) There is a reason to promote X. 
is a reliable one. However, even in this world pain is not (in Lance and Little’s 
sense) a paradigmatic reason in favour of actions that promote it. So local 
reliability is neither necessary nor sufficient for the inferential propriety 
Lance and Little have in mind. 
 Instead of thinking of the inferential propriety in question as reliability in 
our local circumstances, Lance and Little argue that we should think of it as 
propriety in ‘a set of possible worlds whose contours are set by the goals of 
the given discipline whose inferential proprieties are at issue’.27 In a similar 
vein, Marc Lange has argued that scientific laws can admit of exceptions and 
still qualify as laws; laws are associated with reliable inferences, not excep-
tionless regularities. Moreover, generalizations need not be stable (or the asso-
ciated inference reliable) under all possible counterfactual circumstances. The 
counterfactual conditions under which a generalization must be preserved to
qualify as a law depends upon the larger set of generalizations employed by a 
given science and the questions that such a science is trying to answer.28 As 
Little puts it, ‘In saying that explanations situate instances within broader 
patterns, we are saying, roughly speaking, that when we offer one phenome-
non as explanatory of another we are asserting our confidence that the latter 
always follows from the first within a suitable constellation of possible 
worlds’.29
 This, however, is not enough to distinguish paradigmatic and non-paradig-
matic reasons. For every reason will be associated with a reliable inference in 
a suitable constellation of worlds (or circumstances). The inference will be 
reliable in all those worlds (or circumstances) in which any relevant enabling 
conditions are present and no defeating conditions are present.30 It is worth 
noting that this objection need not apply to Lange’s proposal for understand-
ing scientific laws. Here two points are relevant. First, the laws of nature are 
plausibly thought of as contingent; there are at least other logically possible 
worlds where the laws of nature that obtain in our world do not and other  27. Lance and Little, ‘Particularism and Anti-Theory’, p. 28.  
 28. See M. Lange, ‘Who’s Afraid of Ceteris Paribus Laws? Or: How I Learned to Stop 
Worrying and Love Them’, Erkenntnis 57 (2002), pp. 407-23. 
 29. Little, ‘Moral Generalities Revisited’, p. 300. 
 30. Here we simply set aside possible ‘meta-defeaters’.  
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laws obtain instead. Second, laws of nature, like moral principles, can be 
hedged in various ways. When a purported natural law of the form All Fs are 
G fails to hold, we might then draw three lessons. First, and most obviously, 
we might treat the case as a counterexample; the purported law is no law at 
all. Second, we might understand the law All Fs are G to be hedged in various 
ways and decide that the case is an ‘exception’ of the kind built into the law. 
Third, we might decide that the case falls outside the range of circumstances 
for which the law is to hold. As a possible example of this third case, consider 
a suggestion made by Marc Lange. According to the ‘area law’ of biogeogra-
phy, the biodiversity of an island increases exponentially with the island’s 
area. Such a law would doubtless need to be qualified by a ceteris paribus
clause. In some cases, the biodiversity of an island might diverge from the 
predictions of the area law because of the presence of some ‘disturbing’ factor. 
In other cases, the divergence might be in a case for which the area law was 
never designed. As Lange puts it, 
Biogeographers are interested in how species would have been distributed had 
(say) Gonwanaland not broken up, and in how Montserrat’s biodiversity would 
have been affected had the island been (say) half as large. On the other hand, 
biogeography is not responsible for determining how species would have been 
distributed had Earth failed to have had the Moon knocked out of it by cata-
clysm early in its history. Biogeographers do not need to be geophysicists.31
 Thus even were it successfully argued that if the Moon had not been
knocked out of Earth, the biodiversity of islands would not correspond to the 
predictions of the area law, this would not falsify the area law or show it not 
to be a law. Lange’s claim will be contested, and it is not our aim to defend 
it. We do wish to argue, however, that Lange’s suggestion is not one that can 
be especially helpful in drawing the distinction between default and non-
default reasons. 
 As the example of the area law makes clear, the exceptions tolerated by the 
area law are real possibilities. Presumably there is some fact about how much 
biodiversity there would have been if the Moon had never been. This is a fact 
about biodiversity and about geography, but, if Lange is right, it falls outside
the scope of the concerns of biogeography. Now consider the analogous sug-
gestion for moral theory. There are moral facts, but these fall outside the scope 
of the concerns of moral theory. Perhaps there are cases in which shoelace
colour is a reason, but these are cases that occur in worlds (or circumstances) 
that fall outside of moral theories’ concerns. There are two problems with this 
suggestion. The first is that we expect moral principles (if any there be) to be 
necessary truths. Kant gave powerful expression to this idea when he claimed 
that if there are moral laws at all they must hold of all rational beings with
absolute necessity.32 Nevertheless, the scope of the necessity that a valid moral 31. Lange, ‘Who’s Afraid of Ceteris Paribus Laws?’, p. 418. 
 32. I. Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (New York:  Macmillan, 1990 [orig. 
1784]): K 389. 
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principle must have is a question that goes to the heart of the nature of 
moral theorizing and that has divided the Aristotelian and Kantian tradi-
tions in normative theory. 
 In the present context, however, there is no need to beg the question
against alternative views of moral theory and moral necessity. For the present 
suggestion encounters a second difficulty. The distinction between default 
and non-default reasons was meant to mark a distinction within the concerns 
of moral reflection (whether this takes a particularist or a generalist form). If 
we apply Lange’s suggestion to the moral case, though, then we seem to be 
marking a distinction between the moral facts that are of concern to norma-
tive theory (and so are relevant to what generalities or principles are true) 
and the moral facts that occur in worlds (or circumstances) that moral theory 
should ignore. This is not the distinction we were after. We started with the 
insight that of the many things that can be morally salient (and are rightly 
seen as such by virtuous agent and moral theorist alike) some are more sali-
ent. We cannot serve that insight by introducing moral facts that fall outside 
the ‘constellation of worlds’ that concern us. 
 There is a further worry about the foregoing approach, at least for those
particularists who have robustly anti-theoretical aspirations. If the ‘exceptions’
to moral principles occur, so to speak, offstage33 in esoteric possible worlds we
can reasonably just ignore then particularism poses little challenge to tradi-
tional normative moral philosophy. Indeed, it would seem that even an advo-
cate of hedonistic act utilitarianism could embrace particularism by arguing 
that the only cases in which the right act and the act that maximizes pleasure
are not one and the same are cases that lie outside the concerns of moral 
philosophy and so do not count against his theory. Many particularists have 
taken precisely such simplistic attempts to codify morality as their target.34
III. The Pragmatic Reading 
We have seen that both the metaphysical reading and the epistemological 
reading of the distinction between default reasons and non-default reasons
are problematic. However, there is one final reading of the distinction which is 
entirely uncontroversial—the pragmatic reading. Indeed, one might plausibly 
suggest that the pragmatic reading is the default interpretation of default rea-
sons. The pragmatic reading begins with the observation that which features 
it makes sense to mention when offering an explanation depends on the 33. We owe this apt phrase to Lange. 
 34. Although we are confident that they would not accept hedonistic act utilitarianism, 
the basic point we are making here may not be an objection to Lance and Little. According 
to them, at least, particularists have typically misapplied their own insights. Particularism is 
not a challenge to moral principles or laws. It simply requires that we ‘revisit what those 
laws look like’. Lance and Little, ‘Particularism and Anti-Theory’, p. 32. On this view, 
perhaps, particularism stands to normative theory much as debates about what a law of 
nature is stands to practising science. 
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context. In particular, facts which are known to be common knowledge need 
not be made explicit when giving an explanation. For example, suppose her 
friends ask Sally why Harry is so upset and she simply replies, ‘He ran into 
Helen today’. In the right context this might be a perfectly good reply even 
though as an explanation it is highly elliptical. The adequacy of this concise 
reply relies on the fact that it is common knowledge, and known among the 
parties to the conversation to be common knowledge, that Harry recently 
went through a bitter divorce with Helen and has not gotten over her yet. 
Had her interlocutors not known Harry’s relation to Helen then Sally would 
need to make these further facts explicit. The same point applies to moral 
explanations. If asked why it would be wrong to invite Helen to the party, 
Sally might simply tell us that her presence would make Harry upset. Sally 
would typically not need to make explicit that inviting Sally is not the only 
way to stop a catastrophic terrorist attack. 
 This already gives us the resources to draw a distinction between default 
reasons and non-default reasons against the backdrop of holism and particu-
larism. On this account, whether a given consideration is a default reason with 
a given valence is itself context-dependent, and in this sense in the holistic
spirit of particularism itself. For the suggestion is that whether a given con-
sideration is usefully understood as a default reason with a given valence 
depends on whether one’s interlocutors would take it as given that such a 
consideration would function as a reason with that valence unless some 
special story was explicitly told as to why it did not so function. That an
action would cause pain is in most contexts a default reason against the action. 
Why? Because the fact that an action would cause pain almost always is a
reason against the action and this is common knowledge and moreover it is 
commonly known to be common knowledge. If someone was puzzled about 
why a given action was objectionable we could typically dispel this puzzle-
ment simply by pointing out that the action would cause some pain. More-
over, this does not presuppose that the person is an atomist and assumes 
that pain always counts against an action. For example, our interlocutor 
might agree that in the context of an S & M room, the fact that an action 
would cause some pain might well speak in favour of the action. The point 
then would be that such contexts are known (and commonly known to be 
known) to be very rare, and this is why it can go without saying that this is 
not the case when it is not. Hence in most local conversational contexts, that 
an action would cause pain is a default reason against the action but also is 
sometimes a non-default reason in favour of an action in certain contexts. We
do not need any fancy metaphysical or epistemological background theory in 
order to draw a perfectly sensible contextualist distinction between default 
reasons and non-default reasons. 
 Moreover, in our view, the pragmatic reading is considerably more plausible 
than its rivals and not only because it avoids the objections pressed against
those rivals in sections I and II. It also fits better with a reflective understand-
ing of the sources of our own intuitions. For those intuitions themselves seem 
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highly sensitive to contingent features of our situation. Consider again our 
previous example of athletic crab-people. It seems very likely that such peo-
ple would not find the idea that pain provides a default reason against an 
action very plausible, assuming that they all agree that being constitutive of 
athletic accomplishment is sufficient (meta-defeaters to one side) to make 
pain into a reason in favour of the action which causes it. To take another 
example, suppose that most instances of pleasure were sadistic. If we agree 
with the standard particularist idea that sadism is a defeater of the reason-
giving force of considerations of pleasure then (meta-defeaters to one side) 
this would entail that most instances of pleasure would not provide a reason 
to perform actions which would promote the pleasure. In a world in which 
this was the case and widely known to be the case, we submit that the intu-
ition that pleasure provides a default reason in favour of an action that 
promotes pleasure would not be widely held.35 Indeed, the opposite intuition 
might well be dominant. This fits perfectly with the pragmatic reading, for 
whether a consideration is a default reason on the pragmatic reading does 
depend on local conditions. This suggests that it would be a mistake to inter-
pret our own intuitions about default reasons in a metaphysically or episte-
mologically grandiose way. 
 Is drawing the distinction pragmatically enough to save the particularist 
from the objection that their account implausibly flattens the landscape? 
Perhaps. Here we must simply assume with the particularists that all sorts of 
considerations can sometimes be reasons for action, even though we do not 
actually accept this thesis. For the objection that the particularist flattens the 
normative landscape does not presuppose that such considerations can never 
be reasons for action, only that their status as reasons is in some way second-
rate. Certainly if shoelace colour sometimes provides a reason for action this 
is in our world very rare. Whereas pleasure and pain typically do provide 
reasons for action. So in our world it is quite reasonable in almost all con-
versational contexts to treat pleasure and pain as default reasons but not 
treat shoelace colour and other such bizarre considerations as default reasons 
even if we agree that the latter can in suitably weird circumstances also pro-
vide reasons for action. This avoids the charge that the particularist flattens 
the actual normative landscape, but is that enough? For it now seems that in 
a world in which shoelace colour typically did provide a reason with a given 
valence (and was known to do so, and known to be known to do so) it would
be appropriate to treat shoelace colour as a default reason as well. This does
indeed follow from what we take to be the best way of drawing the distinction 35. One peculiarity of the case is that sadists might be unlikely to realize that their 
sadistic pleasures do not count in favour of an action. However, we could handle this situ-
ation by stipulating that we are now talking about a species of rational creatures most of 
whom are incapable of pleasure, but a very few of them are capable of pleasure albeit only 
sadistic ones. It might well be common knowledge amongst the members of such a species 
that pleasure does not typically provide a reason in favour of actions which promote it. 
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between default reasons and non-default reasons and perhaps this is embar-
rassing for the particularist. However, in our view the embarrassment here 
stems not from the pragmatic reading of default reasons but rather from the 
particularist commitment to the thesis that weird considerations like consid-
erations of shoelace colour can even sometimes be a reason for action. In our 
view, such weird considerations can themselves never be reasons for action. 
Hence we agree that there is a deep and non-pragmatic asymmetry between 
shoelace colour and pain; the former can never be a (primary) reason for 
action while the latter can. Which is just to say that the best way to accom-
modate such deep asymmetries is to reject particularism’s highly ecumenical 
account of reasons for action.  
Conclusion
Particularism threatens to flatten the normative landscape, marking no nor-
mative distinction between shoelace colour and pain. Particularists typically 
try to avoid this conclusion by drawing a distinction between default reasons 
and non-default reasons, but the ambitious metaphysical and epistemological 
glosses they typically give this distinction are either problematic in them-
selves (the metaphysical reading) or interesting but unpromising as a way to 
avoid the flattening of the normative landscape (the epistemological reading). 
The distinction should instead be understood pragmatically. This might be 
enough for the particularist to avoid the charge that their account flattens 
the actual normative landscape. However, in certain counterfactual contexts 
particularism would flatten the normative landscape. In our view, the solu-
tion to this problem is not to resurrect some version of the metaphysical or 
epistemological reading of default reasons. Rather, we should simply reject 
the particularist’s highly promiscuous attitude to what kinds of considera-
tions can be reasons for action. However, a full defence of this diagnosis of 
the particularist’s error must await another day. 
